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THE CONSTITUTION AND CONSTITUTIONAL
TRADITION*

By CHARLts S. Cowiamt
The purpose of this paper is to call attention to some features of the development of constitutional law in the United
States that justify, as the writer believes, the view that we have
a practical Constitution, not embodied in any document or
group of documents, which both transcends and limits the
familiar written Constitution to whose text we constantly recur.
It would be natural to refer to this controlling body of rules and
principles as an invisible Constitution, or an unwritten Constitution. Yet it is being reduced to writing constantly by the
judges, who have the power to pierce through the problems of
interpretation, and who are themselves the vital factors in the
evolution of legal tradition. Perhaps this point can be made
clear by saying that our constitutional law comprises much more
than our written Constitution. Even if we put aside those principles actually controlling in our political system which seem to
have a non-legal character, and which cannot be enforced by the
judicial courts, we still have an enormous development of doctrines and concrete decisions which are related to our written
Constitution only by way of afterthought, but which will be
applied and enforced by the courts as constitutional law as
against the independent choice of other governmental agencies.
The criterion of constitutional law in this sense is that it is paramount law, to which other law must conform. The rules and
principles comprised in the invisible Constitution are equally
* Address delivered December 2, 1937, at a Convocation of the University of Kentucky, appointed to celebrate the sesquicentennial anniversary of the formation of the Constitution of the United States and
Its submission to the people In September, 1787.
t Professor of Law, George Washington University; A. B., 1911,
Harvard College; LL. B., 1916; S. J. D., 1932, Harvard Law School.
Author of articles In various legal periodicals.
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binding in practice with those that are plainly to be derived
from a study of the written Constitution. The invisible Constitution is authoritative. It will be enforced by the courts and
must be applied in practice.
Of course, the attempt is constantly made by conservative
students to explain the entire development of constitutional law
as a matter of interpretation of certain particular phrases in the
Constitution. There are phrases in that famous document which
are indeed hopefully broad and indefinite, and which call for
much interpretation and explanation, but which hardly justify
the immense significance that has been attributed to them in the
development of our constitutional law. The principal phrases
that have been believed by many to carry actually this excessive
load of legal significance are the due process of law clauses in
the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, and the phrase "judicial
power" as used in Article III. These phrases are, so to speak,
the sacramental phrases of the Constitution. They are the outward and visible signs of an inward and spiritual grace. Through
them are made visible and plain to the eye of faith enormous systems of doctrine which, if we view the matter realistically, seem
to be drawn from other spheres than the text of the Constitution.
In truth, these elaborate doctrines are derived from general legal
traditions, from the principles of economics and of governmental
practice, and particularly from the history and traditions of the
common law and of democratic government, as practiced in the
United States through a long period.
The difficulty with regard to ascribing all this doctrinal
development to a few magical words in the constitutional text is
both one of political theory and one of realism. As a matter of
fact, these terse constitutional phrases are not the actual source
of the rich content of Qonstitutional law which has been attributed to them. The source of the due process decisions actually
lies in juristic tradition and in the history and experience of
democratic institutions, particularly in our own country. To
assert that the vast meaning of due process of law is really inherent in these four words--due process of law-is to impose an
impossible burden on the lexicographer. To take such a view is
not realistic, and it is in a pragmatic sense a false view, for it
leads one to under-rate greatly the importance of factors outside
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the true field of textual interpretation in determining the final
practical meaning and application of constitutional phrases.
Again, this view seems erroneous as a matter of political
theory because the courts are not merely the guardians of constitutional phrases. They are the guardians of the established
legal order. The courts deal not merely in texts and phrases,
nor can they rely wholly even upon such inspired text as we
find in the Constitution of the United States. They deal in
practical problems, and in the maintenance of orderly development throughout the entire sphere of economic, political, and
social relationships. As a matter of fact, courts have historically
never confined themselves to the mere enforcement of legislative
enactments. They have always been busily engaged in developing their own juristic traditions. The two great forces, enactment and tradition, have developed side by side. As progressive forces, they may be compared to the two legs of a man,
which alternately serve him in his forward movement. Both
seem to be indispensable to proper legal development. This
characteristic has not been confined to Anglo-American legal
history, but is as readily to be discerned in the legal history of
ancient Rome, and in the jurisprudence of modern continental
Europe. It has in fact been a universal judicial practice to
develop tradition and to enrich the law by the infusion of new
elements derived from the learning and experience of the jurists
themselves.
It would be strange if this universal judicial practice of
resorting to nourishing traditions should suddenly disappear
when we come to the field of constitutional law. Consider the
background of a judge who has always been accustomed to study
the development of the common law along with the interpretation of statutes, a judge who has always been accustomed to
examine the evolution of old equitable principles, and even to
invent new ones to meet the needs of his own day. Such a lawyer
has never been accustomed to limit himself in his professional
studies to the literal interpretation and application of enactments of appropriate legislative authority. How could a man
with such experience and such a background give up entirely the
idea of developing, or, as the German language picturesquely
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phrases it, unfolding legal tradition' when set to the task of
interpreting and aplying the Constitution of the United States.
It would have been a complete anomaly in legal history if in
constitutional law the element of enactment had been the sole
and supreme element, and the element of juristic tradition had
fallen into entire or even partial abeyance. The lesson of history
in this field surely is that both enactment and tradition have
their place. Our written Constitution, after all, is only an
enactment. Apart from its paramount character, it is like a
statute or administrative ordinance adopted at a particular time.
It is necessary, in order to attain the highest possibilities in the
administration of justice, that enactments be supplemented and
corrected at many points by the development of the traditional
element in the law. The theory of justice has its permament
place as a force in our legal development, as well as the theory
of legislation.
The scope of this paper is too limited for the writer to
attempt to describe with any fullness the nature or content of
that large portion of our practical constitutional law, which is
in fact derived not from the visible text of the Constitution, but
from invisible and secret sources. But we may set forth some
statements with regard to three phases in the development of our
American constitutional law which illustrate and justify what
has been said about the practical importance of our invisible
Constitution. These three matters are as follows:
First, the importance of juristic tradition in determining
the judicio approach to constitutiodquestions and the judicic
method in solving those questions. This topic might be called
"The Mystery of the Nature of Judicial Power." The term
"judicial power" is used in the Constitution, but no definition
or effective description of it is given. Yet the meaning to be
attributed to this term, or in a more practical sense, the power
to be actually exercised by the federal judges, embraces a subject
of enormous and critical importance.
Second, the use of the functiona approach in constitutional
interpretation. The language of the Constitution has been interpreted, and very properly in my opinion, largely in terms of the
fundamental purposes which our system of government was
2Rechtsentwickerung-a significant term used by Hegel and other
German juristic writers.
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established to accomplish. But if we seek to interpret and apply
the Constitution in terms of the fundamental purposes of the
framers, we encounter new difficulties that might have been
avoided if we had adhered to the method of interpreting the Constitution in a conceptual way. The essence of the functional
approach to constitutional interpretation is that the Constitution
is to be interpreted in terms of the practical purposes that led to
its establishment, rather than of the conceptual purport of the
language which the Constitution employs. It is not the constitutional phraseology, but the constitutional objectives that are
controlling. But it is obvious that in order to determine what
those purposes were, we are obliged to draw upon unwritten
sources. This subject might be entitled "The Mystery of the
Unwritten Purposes of the Founders of Our Government."
Third. The third matter is the special significance of juristic tradition in conserving and protecting the general legal
order, the familiar economic institutions, the accepted political
and social ideals. The Constitution does not in literal terms
refer to these matters, but it does declare that no person shall
be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of
law. These terms, "life", "liberty", and "property", are
broad in themselves, but furthermore, they may be regarded as
representative terms which stand for the entire body of historically developed human rights. When some novel enactment is
forced into the scenes of legal security in which we have historically grown up, and which are in conformity with our
inherited and sincerely accepted ideals, we often feel that the
intrusive statute or ordinance must be set aside and denied
legal effect because of its practical inconsistency with what we
believe to be tried and true. And yet, there may not be any
definite provision in the Constitution which contradicts by its
paramount authority the novel enactment. But it is possible in
practice to take the view that the Constitution was intended to
establish security for the general social, economic, and political
institutions with which the framers of the government were
familiar, and that radical violations by sporadic political action
of these cherished traditions must be denied enforcement on
constitutional grounds. The due process clause is a familiar
and often accepted channel through which arguments actually
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derived from judicial tradition and from inherited American
experience are brought to bear upon a concrete problem as to
the validity of a novel enactment or an administrative act questioned on fundamental grounds. This third division of our subject could appropriately be called "The Great and Growing
Mystery of Due Process of Law."
Let us examine briefly each of the three subjects just suggested.
And first, as to the Mystery of the Nature of Judicial Power.
What then is the nature of judicial power? What are its limits
and what constitutes the essential features of its technical
method? The Constitution itself furnishes no answer. Article
III of the Constitution does set forth a list of cases to which the
judicial power extends. That is, the jurisdiction of the federal
courts is defined by designating categories of cases to which the
power of those courts may be applied. But what is this power
itself ?
To answer that question we must fall back upon tradition
and experience. It is doubtless true that when the framers
adopted the broad phrase "judicial power" and incorporated it
into the Constitution of the United States, they had in mind
judicial power as exercised in England and in the American
colonies. They were not thinking of judicial power as exercised
in an imaginary system that might appeal to some political
philosopher, nor were they thinking of judicial power as exercised on the continent of Europe. It is therefore legitimate to
conclude, as our courts have done, that the nature and limits of
judicial power as granted and established by the Constitution of
the United States can best be ascertained by referring to the
traditional powers of the English courts of general jurisdiction.
Now, if this criterion be accepted, we. find a sure and sufficient foundation for the doctrine of Marbury v. Madison 2 as to
the power and duty of our courts to disregard enactments that
in the judgment of the courts transgress constitutional limitations. For the English courts, unlike the courts of all the countries of continental Europe, have been accustomed from time
immemorial to pass judicially upon the recurring question
whether or not some specific action of politically constituted au21

Cranch 137, 2 L. Ed. 60 (1803).
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thorities, such as municipalities, administrative agencies, military
commanders, and colonial governments, was violative of the
fundamental legal limitations placed upon those governmental
units. 3 This principle has been applied even to the action of the
crown itself, and the English courts have, at least since the time
of James I, been accustomed to disregard acts of the crown or
of the ministers, acting in the name of the crown, that were in
fact beyond the legal limit of the royal prerogative, as defined
and analyzed by the courts themselves, upon the basis of practice and tradition. 4 Judicial power in England has come to mean
that the authority of all governmental agencies has in each case
a legal nature, is confined within legally determined limitations,
and except as to -the formal legislation of Parliament itself, is
subject to judicial review. The English use the expression
"ultra vires"--"beyond the lawful powers"-where we would
frequently use the term "unconstitutional". The effect is the
same. The courts have established a paramount body of law,
by means of which attempted digressions by any other governmental authority from the proper legal sphere assigned to it may
be repressed.
In the light of this background-the nature of the judicial
power in England-the decision in Marbury v. Madison was an
historical necessity. Marbury v. Madison, however, is only one
chapter in the story of judicial power. What shall be the evidentiary basis for a ruling of unconstitutionality? Must unconstitutionality be established beyond a reasonable doubt, or will
a fair preponderance of adverse evidence suffice? Mlay a constitutional issue be resolved by reliance upon judicial notice in
opposition to factual evidence of record? lay a law be unconstitutional as applied to one set of facts, and constitutional as
applied to another? Can statutory paragraphs be separated, and
if one paragraph be found violative of constitutional principles,
may the other be enforced notwithstanding the loss of its
associate ?
3Clark's Case, 5 Coke 64a (1596); Rex v. Cutbush, 4 Burrow 2204
(1768); Winthrop v. Lechmere, 5 Mass. Historical Society Collections,
Sixth Series 440 (1728); Mostyn v. Fabrigas, Cowp. 161 (1774); Attorney-General for British Columbia v. Attorney-General for Canada,
[1937] A. C. 377.
"Prohibitions del Roy, 12 Coke 63 (1607); Proclamations, 12 Coke
74 (1600); Campbell v. Hall, Cowper 204 (1774); Walker v. Baird,
[1892] A. C. 491.
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What sort of an interest must the complainant have in order
to make it the duty of the court to pass upon a constitutional
question? Does judicial power extend to the rendering of declaratory judgments ? Just what novel forms of judicial action
shall be included in this new category-declaratory judgments?
Must the court refrain from deciding political issues, and how
shall the category of political issues be defined?
It seems obvious that we have here a host of questions of a
truly fundamental nature, relating to the application of judicial
power to the settlement of constitutional disputes. It is not
sufficient to present to the courts a constitutional problem defined in a precise scholastic way. They cannot be required to give
an answer to any such abstract inquiry. The problem must be
presented in the midst of a concrete case, and that case must be
in all respects suitable for the application of the judicial power.
As the phrase goes, it must be a justiciable controversy, and
the constitutional problem must be illuminated by convincing
proof, introduced in accordance with traditional legal procedure.
Now, the point that I wish to make in regard to this whole
matter is simply that the method and scope of the application of
judicial power to these controversies involving constitutional
issues are not defined in the Constitution. It is possible to take
the view that the entire difficulty is a matter of interpreting the
phrase "judicial power". But as before suggested, this involves
placing a crushing burden upon the lexicographer. The most
that can be said for the phrase in the written Constitution is
that it incorporates by reference a great existing body of doctrine. The fact is that in determining their own approach and
method of action in constitutional disputes, the courts are compelled to draw upon vast reservoirs of tradition. They must
select the materials that they are to utilize, and thus their
handling of tradition becomes creative and significant. The
principles developed in these inquiries are really fundamental
to the whole of constitutional law.
The second great field that has been mentioned, in which
we seem to be dealing with an unwritten Constitution, lies before
us when we attempt to reconstruct imaginatively the purposes
which the framers of the Constitution had in mind. All principles should be construed in the light of the purposes for which
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they were established. The secret of the law lies in its purposes
or policies, and not in the literal purport of its rules and formulas. Certainly the dominant modern tendency is to study law
from this point of view. And we could hardly expect that constitutional law would escape so pervasive a juristic tendency.
In fact, it has not so escaped.
To make this point more concrete, let us consider, for
example, the problem of defining the commerce power of the
federal government. We can attempt to construe the words of
the grant as a matter of precise rhetoric. We can, if we choose,
rely upon that method exclusively. We then examine the dictionaries, ancient and modern, to determine the meaning of the
word "commerce". We ascertain, for example, that the word
seems to be derived from a Latin prototype, which was itself a
compound based upon a simple popular phrase---"cum merce""with merchandise". It is interesting that the literary method
of investigation suggests the idea that commerce is a matter of
sales primarily, and not of transportation primarily, as many of
our contemporaries seem to think. But our literary investigation soon convinces us that the word "commerce" has a vast
and comprehensive meaning, and that it includes not only sales
and transportation, but also the general intercourse of the market
place, communication, bargaining, and the process of payment,
as well as the contract of sale, considered by itself alone.
There is, however, a deeper meaning behind this linguistic
investigation. The words of our language represent concepts,
developed by long racial or national experience, that correspond
to the realities of actual life. The French have a pithy saying
that points clearly to this last idea: "La Science est une langue
b ien faite"--"Science itself is a well-constructed language." In
other words, there is a scientific or philosophical element in language. The categories or classifications established almost instinctively by our ancestors in constructing the standards and
forms of language represent real scientific work in the analysis
of ideas. Hence, when we analyze words, we are analyzing concepts. We are not dealing with language in an ornamental or
merely pedantic sense. We are dealing with language as a guide
to underlying realities.
But for all its legal interest and philosophical value, this
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method of analyzing the language of the Constitution, that is,
seeking its true purport and meaning through the formal value
of the words employed, has its obvious limitations and drawbacks. The constitutional phrase we are now discussing reads:
"Congress shall have power to regulate Commerce with foreign
Nations and among the several States and with the Indian
Tribes.' ' Why was this power given to Congress by the
framers? Did they mean to turn over to the Congress as complete
a control over commerce among the states as that granted over
foreign commerce? Is the power to regulate commerce merely a
power to police its operation, to iron out definite difficulties, perhaps sometimes to divert its natural flow; or is it also a power to
foster, protect, and subsidize commerce? Again, in view of the
complex inter-relation between commerce among the states and
local commerce, agriculture, and manufactures, how shall we
determine where the federal zone of control begins? Does it not
depend on the purpose or purposes for which this grant of power
was made to the federal government?
All students of constitutional law are familiar with the important case of Hammer v. Dagenhart,6 in which the Supreme
Court held that Congress could not constitutionally exclude from
the channels of interstate commerce articles manufactured by
child labor in the several states. This statute was in form a
regulation of commerce among the states. In its primary aspect,
it sought to regulate and control the movement of goods from one
state to another. Suppose that Congress had passed a statute prohibiting the importation of articles made by child labor in foreign countries. Would not this form of external tariff or embargo have been valid and controlling ?7 Itis pretty clear from
our history that the power to regulate foreign commerce is complete in itself, and is not limited by the consideration that this
regulation may produce a secondary effect of very important
dimensions upon productive industry. In fact, the power to
regulate foreign commerce has often been used for the very purpose of assisting productive industry in our own country. Why
U. S. Const., Art. I, Sec. 8, cl. 3.
6 247 U. S.251, 38 Sup. Ct. 529, 62 L. Ed. 1101 (1918).
'The Brig Aurora, 7 Cranch 382, 3 L. Ed. 378 (1813); Field v.
Clark, 143 U. S. 649, 12 Sup. Ct. 495, 36 L. Ed. 294 (1892); J. W.
Hampton, Jr., & Company v. United States, 276 U. S. 394, 48 Sup. Ct.
348, 72 L. Ed. 624 (1928).
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does not the power to regulate commerce among the several states
have an equivalent breadth of application? The two powers,
if they are to be distinguished as such, are granted in the same
clause of the same sentence.8 The phrases "with foreign nations"
and "among the several states" are simple prepositional phrases
that modify the same principal phrase, namely, "to regulate commerce". From a purely conceptual point of view, how is it possible that regulating commerce with foreign nations is so different from regulating commerce among the several states? How
then can the decision in Harnmer v. Dagenhart be justified? Is
it not directly in contradiction of decisions establishing the
complete power of Congress over foreign commerce?
From the conceptual standpoint, the anomaly seems complete. But if we consider what were the purposes of the framers
of the Constitution, it is easy to persuade oneself that the purpose in granting control to Congress over foreign commerce
was different from the purpose in granting control over commerce among the states. The power of regulating foreign commerce had been exercised by Congress under the Articles of Confederation, before our present Constitution was adopted, 9 though
perhaps these Acts could be related in most instances to the
treaty-making power of the federal government, as then constituted. At an earlier date, this power over foreign commerce
had been systematically exercised by the British Parliament.
Nothing was taken, therefore, from the states when the power
to regulate foreign commerce was confirmed to Congress in the
Constitution of 1787-our present Constitution. No theory of
implied reservation of existing state authority can therefore be
appropriate with relation to foreign commerce. Furthermore,
the necessity of a united national front as against foreign nations
in commercial matters was obvious. The framers must have
intended that the power of Congress should be entirely selfsufficient in the field of foreign commerce, adequate for uniform
national protection, and adaptable readily to the varying requirements of shifting national policy.

But the power to regulate commerce among the several
states was carved out of powers held by the states in 1787. It
1 U. S. Const., Art. I, Sec. S, cl. 3.
"Article IX, Articles of Confederation, adopted by Congress July 9,
1778.

K. L. J.-2
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was a new grant, made because of distinct considerations, not
relevant to the grant of power over foreign commerce. The history of those times shows that in giving to Congress the power
to regulate commerce among the several states, the framers
sought to remove barriers and to stimulate commerce. They
were not planning a restrictive power, designed to limit the flow
of commerce. They hardly can be supposed to have intended to
grant to Congress much control over local production and industry, as incidental to the grant of control over commerce. They
were not thinking of such control as a part of the commerce
power. The pervasive and sensitive contacts of modern commerce were unknown to them. Our rapid systems of transportation and communication, the close inter-relation of the different
elements in the economic system of the nation today, the competitive bidding of firms in many different states for the same
orders, have brought about a situation where the exclusion of
any classification of goods from commerce among the states
would immediately produce a most serious dislocation of the
productive industry engaged in the manufacture of goods of
that classification. The control over commerce, if thus extended,
becomes control over production, not only in large-scale manufacturing industries, but in agriculture, in mining, in forestry, and
in industries of every sort. Was it the purpose of the framers
by the simple words of the commerce clause to grant to Congress
such an enormous power over concerns which in the scene that
lay before them during their lives appeared to be matters of
local concern, widely separated from commerce among the
states !
Whether sound or not, this conclusion was accepted by the
Supreme Court. 10 The majority of the court felt that there was
an implied limitation upon the commerce power, derived from
the necessity of preventing the application of that power from
upsetting too seriously the balance of authority between the
nation and the states. I do not wish, as a matter of ultimate
personal opinion, to express agreement with the decision in
Hammer v. Dagenhart. My purpose is simply to set forth the
true explanation of that decision. I merely wish to point out
that the conclusion the Supreme Court reached in that case really
10Hammer v. Dagenhart, note 6, supra.
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depends upon a determination as to what the fundamental purpose of the framers was in relation to the commerce clause. The
court's conclusion cannot well be derived from a mere analysis
of the conceptual purport of the words of the commerce clause.
What then are the purposes which the commerce clause was
intended by the framers to accomplish or to promote? Was it
their intention to establish a regime of free trade as between the
states ? If so, it would be correct to hold that the affirmative
regulatory power granted to Congress was intended to be exclusive, so that the states could not legislate so as to restrict in any
way the flow of interstate commerce, even in the silence of Congress. Again, if the purpose was to establish a regime of free
trade among the states, the regulatory power of Congress must
be construed so as to sustain statutes that foster and protect
commerce, but not so as to sustain ordinarily statutes that limit,
restrict, or impede commerce among the states.
Was it the fundamental purpose to establish a regime of
iniform commercial regulation throughout the nation? If so,
it would seem that the affirmative powers of Congress over interstate commerce must be employed exclusively for establishing
regulations uniform in their actual operation and practical effect.
Uniformity of formal application might not be enough to justify
a statute in connection with such a fundamental constitutional
purpose, because the statute might by its terms produce a practical and economic discrimination as between different sections
of the country. For example, Congress adopted in 1935 an Act
known as the Ashurst-Sumners Aet," which makes it unlawful
to transport in interstate commerce goods made by convict labor
into any state where the goods are intended to be sold or usea
in violation of its laws. If Kentucky and Tennessee permit the
sale and transportation of convict-made goods, but Oho does
not, the Ashurst-Sumners Act makes it lawful to transport conviet-made goods from Kentucky to Tennessee, but not .rom Kentucky to Ohio. The actual commercial movement of goods of
this character will therefore depend upon state laws, and the
uniformity of our commercial system will be inerrupted.
Of course, the more serious aspect of this matter is that
the principle applied by the AshursC.Sumners Act to convict149 Stat. 494 (49 U. S. C. A. Secs. 61-645.
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made goods is seemingly capable of application to goods of other
classifications. Thus, a statute which forbade the transportation of articles made by child labor of a certain type or classification into a state that prohibited child labor of that type or
classification would be sustainable by the same arguments as
those used with relation to the Ashurst-Sumners Act. But such
goods could be moved freely into states that did not have restrictive laws of this sort. Similar regulations might be applied
to many classifications of merchandise, with the result that interstate commerce would assume a checker-board character, and
uniformity of commercial regulation throughout the nation
would disappear.
Was it, perhaps, the chief purpose of the commerce clause
to establish a regime under which the states were to be disabled
from adopting laws and regulations that would blockade any
part of our national commerce, and cause it to flow by an
uneconomic and comparatively unsuitable routet Many decisions of the Supreme Court, particularly with regard to the
validity of state laws, can be best explained on the basis of this
somewhat narrower principle. 12 No state may deny the facilities
within its territory for the transportation, storage, and wholesale merchandising of goods which are in fact in the stream of
interstate or national commerce. Yet, the same state may prohibit retail sales of many commodities, such as liquor, cigarettes,
oleomargarine, and presumably many other articles, to which a
restrictive policy can appropriately be applied consistently with
the constitutional freedom of the individual. Such prohibitions
obviously have repercussions on commerce among the states. The
volume of interstate movement into a particular state will be
greatly diminished if retail sales are not permitted. Congress
could doubtless affirmatively regulate the movement of goods
into a state that were intended for retail sale, and it has sometimes done so--for example, in the Pure Food and Drug Acts.' 3
This seems to show that this movement is affirmatively a part of
32Woodruff v. Parham, 8 Wallace 123 (1868); Wabash, St. Louis
& Pacific Ry. v. Illinois, 118 U. S. 557, 7 Sup. Ct. 4, 30 L. Ed. 244
(1886); Leisy v. Hardin, 135 U. S. 100, 10 Sup. Ct. 681, 34 L. Ed. 128
(1890); Austin v. Tennessee, 179 U. S. 343, 21 Sup. Ct. 132, 45 L. Ed.
224 (1900); Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Speight, 254 U. S. 17, 41
Sup. Ct. 11, 65 L. Ed. 104 (1920).
23 34 Stat. 768
(21 U. S. C. A. Sees. 1, et seq.).
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interstate commerce. How then can the state effectively dam back
this tide of commercial movement by forbidding retail sales
within its jurisdiction? Of course, a provisional answer to this
dilemma is found in the "original package" doctrine and the
decisions pursuant to it. 1 4 But the constitutional grant itself says
nothing about original packages. We have to infer in some way
that the fundamental purpose of the grant, contemplating as it
does a division of authority between the nation and the states
with reference to commerce and the various interests connected
with commerce, was decided upon by the framers of the Constitution with the purpose of establishing such an equilibrium
between national and state powers as will award to state authority an appropriate sphere of local police action, even when this
affects interstate commerce, whilst at the same time, the general
interests of national commerce cannot be in any way subverted
by any state whose views or policy are not in accord with those
of Congress.
The point that the writer wishes especially to emphasize is
that the purposes which the framers had in mind with regard to
the commerce clause were never plainly written down. Certainly
they are not stated in the text of the Constitution. They really
have to be reconstructed imaginatively. There are various sorts
of evidence to which we can resort. But the truth is that the
courts are forced to rely upon independent reasoning, upon history, and upon such knowledge as they can gather of the principles and contentions of the economists, as guides to the correct
solution. The purpose that has to be ascertained is not something fixed historically in 1787. We do not inquire simply what
would the man of 1787, with his viewpoint at that time, have
desired. But the problem goes deeper. What would be the purpose of the ideal man of 1787 at the present time, if he were
brought face to face with our present situation? We have to
establish an ideal continuity between the purposes of the framers
and the transformed purposes which work in the same directions
today. All of this calls for the independent thought of the
judges. The principles worked out in this field can hardly be
214Brown v. Maryland, 12 Wheat. 419, 6 L. Ed. 678 (1827); American Steel and Wire Co. v. Speed, 192 U. S. 500, 24 Sup. Ct. 365, 48
L. Ed. 538 (1904); Austin v. Tennessee, 179 U. S. 343, 21 Sup. Ct. 132,
45 L. Ed. 224 (1900).
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said to be genuinely a part of the written Constitution. The
doctrine of the "original package," for example, with all its
shadings and variations, is today impliedly a part of the commerce clause. But in building this elaborate structure of interpretation and interlineation upon the text of the Constitution,
the courts have actually been engaged in independent effort.
They have made us a new Constitution, somewhat after the
likeness of the Constitution of 1787, but in reality greatly enriched with additional elements derived from a great variety
of outside sources and worked together into one elaborate structure, so unified in character, and so consistent and convincing in
its logical appeal that most persons fail to notice its composite
nature.
'When we come to the great subject of due process in American constitutional law, almost anyone must admit that the element of tradition greatly outweighs the element of enactment.
Due process of law is a comprehensive juristic concept for the
protection of private rights as against all forms of governmental
action.
The phrase is an ancient one, and occurs, as everyone has
heard, in Lord Coke's annotations upon the text of Magna Carta.
Where the text of Magna Carta reads: "No free man shall be
imprisoned unless by the legal judgment of his peers and by the
law of the land," Lord Coke gives an explanation of the phrase
"by the law of the land". His annotation is: "that is, by the due
course and process of the law". This phrase suggests procedural
protection primarily. Yet its chief application historically in
the development of American constitutional law has been to
protect substantive rights from invasion by statutory enactments. Curiously enough, it has not been applied so frequently
for the protection of procedural rights. 15 One reason for this
apparent perversion is that procedural rights are in several
instances separately guaranteed, especially as against action of
the federal government, by more specific phrases in the amendments to the Constitution. From this consideration has been
derived the argument that these procedural rights must be
regarded as being outside of due process of law, since the fram'sMaxwell v. Dow, 176 U. S. 581, 20 Sup. Ct. 448, 44 L. Ed. 597
(1900); Hurtado v. California, 110 U. S. 516, 4 Sup. Ct. 111, 28 L. Ed.
232 (1884); Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U. S. 78, 29 Sup. Ct. 14, 53
L. Ed. 97 (1908).
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ers of the amendments felt it was necessary to provide more
specific language to guarantee their maintenance. However, in
these latter days, we have seen a notable revival of the doctrine
that due process involves procedural protections. For example,
0 the famous Scottsboro case, the Supreme
in Powell v. Alabaina,1
Court held that a person who had been tried and condemned in
a state court for a serious crime, without the advantage of having confidential counsel definitely assigned to him and able to
represent him throughout the course of the trial, had been
denied due process of law, in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.
But unquestionably, the more important applications of the
due process clauses in both the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments have been in the field of preserving the accepted legal
order of historically defined substantive rights as against radical
statutory innovations. It has been held that constitutional liberty
includes the general right of entering into lawful contracts of
all sorts, and. from this it has been inferred that laws adbridging this freedom of contract are generally violative of constitutional safeguards, even when these laws are directed toward
understandable social objectives, such as the elevation of the
standard of living of wage earners or the protection of members
17
of labor unions against unfair discrimination.
Perhaps the most important application of this doctrine of
liberty of contract has been the maintenance by the courts of a
free economic market for commodities and services of all kinds,
as against a very large number of price-fixing efforts that have
been made by the legislatures of the various states and of the
nation. s The Constitution certainly does not forbid price fixing, in so many words. To fix the prices of commodities upon a
fair and rational basis may not seem a more serious interference
with business liberty than many other regulations that have
been imposed by legislation and upheld by the courts. But the
436
441
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,a287 U. S. 45, 53 Sup. Ct. 55, 77 L. Ed. 158 (1932).
27 Adair v. United States, 208 U. S. 161, 288 Sup. Ct. 277, 52 L. Ed.
(1908); Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U. S. 1, 35 Sup. Ct. 240, 59 L. Ed.
(1915); Wolff Packing Company v. Court of Industrial Relations,
U. S. 522, 43 Sup. Ct. 630, 67 L. Ed. 1103 (1923).
"Williams v. Standard Oil, 278 U. S. 235, 49 Sup. Ct. 115, 73 L. Ed.
(1929); Tyson v. Banton, 273 U. S. 418, 47 Sup. Ct. 426, 71 L. Ed.
(1927); Ribnik v. McBride, 277 U. S. 350, 48 Sup. Ct. 545, 72 L. Ed.

913 (1928).
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subject is one on which the Supreme Court has for many years
been very sensitive. Efforts to fix prices have almost invariably
been defeated on constitutional grounds. The well-known case
of Nebbia v. State of New York 19 is an outstanding exception,
but it cannot be said that the force of that case has reversed the
generalization just stated.
We do not have sufficient space to examine with appropriate
care the economic and social ideals by which the judges seem to
have been governed in connection with their doctrines about
constitutional liberty. Suffice it to say that the general character of these ideals has been conservative. That is, the judges
have sought to preserve the system of free economic bargaining
which existed in our country during the first half of the Nineteenth Century under conditions of relative economic equality.
They have sought to preserve the principle of individual selfdetermination in a multitude of legal situations as against the
mass effect of statutes which were aimed to control the individual, albeit for his own good. The judges took this course both
because the ideal of individual self-determination appealed to
their philosophical intuitions, and because it reflected the actualities of the pioneer and equalitarian environment under which
these judges came to mental maturity.
This system of laissez-faire economics had unquestionably
in its time brought forth great fruits in the exploitation of the
riches of the new country and in the reward of individual inventiveness and energy. Under this system, our people had prospered on the whole and enjoyed a degree of practical freedom
that surpassed that attained under most other legal systems
with which we are even now familiar. Therefore, the system
itself seemed to deserve constitutional protection, and the judges
assumed the laborious task of defending it in its entirety as
against the intrusions of reformist legislation. The doctrine
in reality acted upon, though not formally announced, was that
the Constitution protects the existing legal order from radical
and subversive change, even by strong political majorities, acting
through our democratic form of government.
It is clear beyond a doubt that these very extensive additions to our constitutional law, developed in the numerous decii291 U.

S. 502, 54 Sup. Ct. 505, 78 L. Ed. 940 (1934).
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sions under the due process clauses, are not really the compulsory
outcome of the mere adoption of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments, considered as political decisions taken by the
people of the country. The due process clauses were seized upon
as the channels through which arguments might be directed
for the preservation of the existing economic and social order.
The judges, in their due process decisions, are not merely proteeting established rules of the common law, considered simply
in their aspect with regard to litigation, but they are protecting
the entire legal order, which embodies the historically accepted
social and economic ideals of the American people.
Another field in which the due process clause has apparently
wrought wonders has been the development of theories of jurisdiction. In a complex federated government like that of the
United States, problems of jurisdiction are sure to arise. In no
other part of the world does the conflict of laws assume so great
a practical importance as with us in the United States. The
commerce and general business of the country is a closely integrated whole. But there are forty-eight states, and other governmental subdivisions, besides the United States itself, which claim
jurisdiction over one aspect or another of the multitudinous
activities of the business world. Now, the jurists have developed
a great body of doctrine with regard to the theory of the jurisdiction of a state. A centrally important subject of legal study,
known to pedagogues as "the conflict of laws," revolves around
these theories of jurisdiction. But not everyone has noted the
connection between these juristic theories as to the conflict of
laws and the many decisions of our courts which hold that departures from the true and approved doctrines of the conflict of
laws are not merely legal errors, but are violations of the Constitution of the United States. If anyone is affected by governmental action adversely, in a way that violates the accepted
juristic theory of jurisdiction, he can usually with propriety
claim that he has been deprived of rights or property in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, or possibly of the Fifth, if
the federal government happens to be the aggressor in the par20
ticular case.
' Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U. S. 578 (1897); Union Refrigerator
Transit Co. v. Kentucky, 199 U. S. 194, 26 Sup. Ct. 36 (1905); Compania
De Tabacos v. Collector, 275 U. S. 87, 48 Sup. Ct. 100 (1927); The
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It is probable that this result would have occurred without
the due process clauses, at least as regards the action of several
states. The nature of the Union involved reciprocal concessions
by the several states which subtracted something from that
degree of independent authority which they might have enjoyed
as independent nations. The bond of the Union qualifies the
jurisdiction of the states. 21 There were decisions before the
Fourteenth Amendment was adopted that illustrate this point,
for they show that the Fourteenth Amendment was not necessary
to secure the judicial enforcement of jurisdictional limitations
22
upon the several states. For example, in Hays v. Pacific MaiZ,
decided in 1855, it was held that a state tax regularly assessed
on a ship which had lain in a California harbor for a considerable period of time, but which was owned and registered in the
State of New York, and which was present in California for
commercial purposes only, was an unconstitutional burden. The
real ground of this decision was that California exceeded its
jurisdiction in taxing property transitorily present on the same
basis as property permanently located within the state. This
element of unfairness existed before the Fourteenth Amendment as well as later. But the due process clause, in these latter
days, gave a more convenient basis for such rulings. Arguments
which used to be phrased in terms of state encroachment upon
the federal commerce power, or in terms of the impairment of
23
contracts, are now phrased in terms of the due process concept.
But in all phases of the development of these arguments, the
controlling legal issue has really been whether jurisdiction had
properly attached in the state whose governmental action was
under review.
The due process concept has developed its own qualifications
and its own independent philosophy. Laws that are directed
to conserve the physical safety, the health, and the morals of
the people have been largely exempted from troublesome due
Farmers Loan and Trust Co. v. Minnesota, 280 U. S. 204, 50 Sup. Ct.
98 (1930).
Per Hughes, C. J. in Burnet v. Brooks, 288 U. S. 378, at 401, 53
Sup. Ct. 457, 463 (1933).
217 Howard 596, 15 L. Ed. 254 (1854).
23Cf. State Tax on Foreign Held Bonds, 15 Wall. 300, 21 L. Ed.
179 (1872); Pullman's Palace Car Co. v. Pennsylvania, 141 U. S. 18,

esp. the opinion of Bradley dissenting, p. 30 ff., 11 Sup. Ct. 876, 880
(1891).
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process restrictions. The statement has sometimes been made
that the due process clause does not apply as a restriction on the
police power. But the whole question is one of appropriateness.
The term "police power" will not justify any wanton or needless
invasion of private rights under the guise of protecting the
public health.2 4 The decisions of the courts clearly establish
this point.25 A more fundamental reason for avoiding any
radical distinction between the so-called police power cases and
other cases is that no language can be found in the text of the
Constitution, nor can any basic ground be found in historic
experience, which justifies applying the restrictive effect of the
due process clause to other recognized governmental powers,
such as the power to tax, or the power to regulate public utilities, or the power to regulate banks and insurance companies,
in a radically different way from that in which it is applied to
statutes directed to promote the public health. 26 The government, state and national, had regulatory powers with regard to
the three subjects mentioned from the beginning. In these lastnamed fields, however, the due process clause assumes surprising strength, appropriately protecting individuals from the
arbitrary hand of governmental power in every situation. The
truth seems to be that the due process clause is a universal tempering principle, which enables the courts to qualify or restrain
the force of governmental action in appropriate ways, irrespective of the category to which the governmental power in question may be said to belong. The degree of restraint, no doubt,
is various. Thus, it is very clear that the protection given to
private rights in cases where the government attempts what we
ordinarily call public utility regulation is much more complete
than it is in the field where the government attempts what we
call taxation. 27 But in all these fields, there is appropriatepro"'Per Holmes, J. in Jacobsen v. Massachusetts, 197 U. S. 11, at
p. 33, 25 Sup. Ct. 358, 366 (1905).
Louis K. Liggett Co. v. Baldridge, 278 U. S. 105, 49 Sup. Ct. 57,
73 L. Ed. 204 (1928); Weaver v. Palmer Co., 270 U. S. 402, 46 Sup. Ct.
320, 70 L. Ed. 654 (1926); Frost v. Chicago, 178 Illinois 250, 52 N. E.
869 (1899); Wynehamer v.People, 13 N. Y. 378 (1856).
20Noble State Bank v. Haskell, 219 U. S. 104, 31 Sup. Ct. 186, 55
L. Ed. 112 (1911); Otis v. Parker, 187 U. S. 606, 23 Sup. Ct. 168, 47
L. Ed. 323 (1903); German Alliance Ins. Co. v. Lewis, 233 U. S. 389,
34 Sup. Ct. 612, 58 L. Ed. 1011 (1914); O'Gorman and Young v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 282 U. S.251, 51 Sup. Ct. 130, 75 L. Ed. 324 (1931).
11CI. Ohio Valley Water Co. v. Ben Avon Borough, 253 U. S.287,
40 Sup. Ct. 527, 64 L. Ed. 908 (1920), with Phillips v. Commissioner
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tection. The courts have developed an elaborate body of doctrine, into which are interwoven many economic and practical
considerations by means of which they seek to reconcile public
power and private rights, social action for the promotion of
social interests and private effort for private advantage. The
problem is essentially one of equilibrium. But it is a moving
equilibrium, for the relative strength of the public claim and the
private demand in different typical situations will vary as the
years change. But it must be obvious to anyone that the controlling considerations which guide the courts in their mighty
effort to maintain the appropriate balance between the contending forces of governmental or collective action and of individual
effort and private enterprise are not derived from the text of the
Constitution, but come largely from the studies which the judges
can make as to the economic and practical merits of the different
legislative schemes in their relation to the admitted social objectives which the legislature is by one experiment after another
trying to reach.
One last subject remains to be mentioned to round out this
discussion, namely, the great subject of constitutional equality.
We all have examined, perhaps with a thrill of patriotic pride,
the phrase in the Fourteenth Amendment that reads: "Nor
shall any state deprive any person within its jurisdiction of the
equal protection of the laws." The phrase "equal protection
of the laws" suggests equality in procedural matters and
equality in the concrete application of the laws. That is, the
guarantee at first blush seems to mean that no state shall withhold from any individual within its jurisdiction the benefit of
the equal protection or application of the laws. But actually this
clause has been little applied in the procedural field. 28 One
reason for this fact is that such a course of application would
render nearly every issue a constitutional issue. Every litigant
defeated at a trial will represent to an appellate court that he
has not been tried as other men have been tried. If the mere
formulation of a complaint of unequal treatment in this field
of Internal Revenue, 283 U. S. 589, 51 Sup. Ct. 608, 75 L. Ed. 1289

(1931).

mMissouri v. Lewis, 101 U. S. 22, 25 L. Ed. 989 (1879); Frank v.
Mangum, 237 U. S. 309, 35 Sup. Ct. 582, 59 L. Ed. 969 (1915); Ownbey
v. Morgan, 256 U. S. 94, 41 Sup. Ct. 43, 65 L. Ed. 837 (1921).
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of legal procedure were sufficient to enable a defeated litigant
to invoke his constitutional rights, it would be hard to see how
the constitutional element could be kept out of even the simplest
cases. Hence, in a procedural sense, the meaning of the equal
protection clause has been severely restricted. But in compensation, the clause has been very liberally interpreted in a way that
might not have been expected by a philosopher reading the text
of the Fourteenth Amendment for the first time. The equal
protection of the laws has become the pledge of equal laws for
all, and in the determination of whether or not laws are of an
equal character, the courts have assumed another great function
of analyzing and weighing the substantive merits of statutes
29
and other governmental enactments.
In typical arguments on this issue, the requirement of
equality is met by the adverse argument that a permissible classification has been made, and not an obnoxious discrimination
against a disfavored group. There is nothing, of course, in the
text of the Constitution which will enable us to say what is a
proper classification and what is not. Here again, we have the
starting point of a vast juristic development. The equal protection of the laws requires only such equality as is appropriate
in view of the legislative right to make permissible classifications.
The courts are called upon to review the standards of classification and compare the classifications actually attempted with historic principles of justice. In all of this field, the courts are
developing or creating new principles or conceptions. They
are enforcing as paramount law doctrines which, while they may
be verbally related to the equal protection clause, really derive
their content and practical significance from other sources.
A digest of the opinions which the Supreme Court has rendered,
formally based on the equal protection clause in the Fourteenth
Amendment, gives us an interesting body of constitutional law,
which seems to be fundamentally of juristic origin. It belongs
to the element of tradition, and not to the element of enactment
in our constitutional history.
0 Cotting v. Kansas City Stock Yards Co., 183 U. S. 79, 22 Sup. Ct.
30, 46 L. Ed. 92 (1901); Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U. S. 60, 38 Sup. Ct.
16, 62 L. Ed. 149 (1917); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 356, 6 Supp. Ct.
1064, 30 L. Ed. 220 (1886); Dobbins v. Los Angeles, 195 U. S. 223, 25
Sup. Ct. 18, 49 L. Ed. 169 (1904); Quaker City Cab Company v. Pennsylvania, 277 U. S. 389, 48 Sup. Ct. 553, 72 L. Ed. 927 (1928).
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In conclusion, may we not say that astonishing as the vast
development of constitutional law beyond the meager literal
text of the Constitution has been, some such development could
hardly have been avoided, if once we make certain postulates as
to judicial power and as to the desirability and necessity of a
stabilizing and permanent governmental factor that would give
a central character and a philosophical continuity to the development of our institutions? There are so many cases in which
the judges, men of special learning, experience, and insight,
are likely to feel with assurance that they understand the true
and sound doctrine with relation to the limits of governmental
power that ought to be applied in the factual situation under
consideration, whatever politicians or the general public may
think. Whenever this true doctrine was ignored, and these
limits were transgressed by rash political elements temporarily
in control of one branch or another of the political government,
the opportunity potentially open to the judges to declare that
the true doctrine was law, and could not be set aside by the false
doctrine was too tempting to be resisted. It was only necessary
to find the means by which the true doctrine could be given a
superior legal standing, so as to secure it against the assaults of
men "dressed in a little brief authority," but supported in many
instances by great democratic forces, under a system of government supposed to be the most democratic in the world. The
instrument for attaining this necessary subordination of folly to
wisdom was the doctrine of the paramount character of constitutional law. But constitutional law means so much more
than the Constitution. If all constitutional law is to be regarded
as paramount law, we have an instrument which will carry us
far beyond the popular and political belief in a paramount Constitution. By the superior authority of constitutional law,
unsound enactments violative of historically established private
rights were denied practical effect. In order to make this salutary process as pervasive as possible, it was necessary to make
the paramount law as hospitable as possible, so as to include in
it the sound and true wisdom from many sources. Thus, there
has been introduced into our constitutional law a great infusion
of selected materials taken from sources other than the primary
or textual interpretation of the Constitution. These infusions
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have determined the character of our constitutional law more
pervasively and persistently than the primary or literal text of
the Constitution itself.
After all, there is good reason to rejoice, rather than to
repine, over the fact that our national history has taken this
course. Our national Constitution is not merely a document. It
is a great mass of learning and wisdom, attached to, or encrusted
upon an authoritative and fundamental political instrument.
The Constitution is the perfect union of enactment and tradition.

